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South Centre's Papers on the WTO for the Seventh WTO Ministerial Conference
Past Events - 2009

November 2009

Draft Paper by Martin Khor, Executive Director of the South Centre: Analysis of the Doha Negotiations and the Functioning of the WTO

Policy Briefs:

Analytical Notes:


 

Draft Paper by Martin Khor, Executive Director of the South Centre: Analysis of the Doha Negotiations and the Functioning of the WTO

This paper provides an overview of the Doha negotiations to date - in agriculture, non-agriculture market access and services. It also provides a detailed analysis and critique of the functioning of the WTO, particularly the decision-making processes, and suggests ways that the multilateral trading system can be much improved.

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Policy Brief: Is Development Back in the Doha Round?

As trade ministers prepare to assemble November 30 in Geneva for further WTO talks, they are hearing another round of new and refurbished projections of how much wealthier the world might be after liberalizing trade.  The upcoming ministerial is no different, and neither, fundamentally, are the projections, notwithstanding one recent claim that an ambitious Doha deal could deliver $300-$700 billion in global welfare gains, with the benefits "well-balanced" between developed and developing countries.

These recent projections, from the Washington-based Peterson Institute for International Economics, contrast with the World Bank's widely publicized 2005 estimates of global gains from a "likely Doha scenario" of less than $100 billion, with just $16 billion going to developing countries.  Did economists find another $150-$350 billion in benefits for developing countries that the World Bank missed in 2005?  Is development back in the Doha Round. The answer, of course, is no.  The purpose of this policy brief is to look behind the press releases to examine the recent economic projections, review previous estimates, and put these seemingly large numbers in their proper context.  As before, the claims that developing countries will be the big winners from Doha rest on shaky assumptions, controversial economic modeling, misleading representations of the benefits, and disregard for the high costs of Doha-style liberalization for many developing countries

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Draft Policy Brief: The Proposed Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM) in the WTO: Is it still ‘Special'?

This policy brief summarises the research the South Centre has conducted on the Special Safeguard Mechanism, and particularly the conditionalities suggested in the current draft agriculture texts that limit the usage of the instrument.

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Policy Brief: State of Play of the GATS Negotiations: Are Developing Countries Benefiting?

This paper provides an overview of the state of play in the GATS negotiations, both covering the market access negotiations, as well as the rules negotiations.

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Analytical Note: The Extent of Agriculture Import Surges in Developing Countries: What are the Trends

The paper gives an overview of the trends in different groupings of developing countries' agricultural import surges, as well as the import surge statistics for a sample of 56 developing countries. This is followed by a look at the products for which import surges are most frequently occurring. The final section of the paper highlights two individual country examples of import surges: poultry into Ghana and rice into Senegal.

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Analytical Note: The Volume-based Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM): Analysis of the Conditionalities in the December 2008 WTO Agriculture Chair's Texts

This paper examines the conditionalities and their implications for the effectiveness of the volume-based SSM in the December 2008 Agriculture Chair's Modalities. These conditionalities include the trigger level; limits on the remedies and remedy caps; limits on the number of tariff lines that can go beyond the Uruguay Round bound rates; the cross-check; ‘on/off' periods of SSM application; treatment for seasonal and perishable products; exclusion of preferential trade from SSM coverage; exclusion of negligible trade; and pro-rating clauses in calculating the preceding 3-year volume imports. The paper then makes recommendations on how these clauses can be changed so that the SSM can be a more effective instrument for developing countries.

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Analytical Note:  The Price-based Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM): Trends in Agriculture Price Declines and Analysis of the Conditionalities in the December 2008 WTO Agriculture Chair's Text

This paper begins by highlighting the frequency of price declines experienced by developing countries. It then touches on the use of the price-based Special Safeguard Provision (SSG) by developed countries.

The paper then looks at the conditionalities of the WTO Agriculture Chair's December 2008 text (TN/AG/W/4/Rev.4). These include exclusion of en route shipments from the price-based SSM coverage; the trigger and remedy, and the omission to take into account the value declines in ad valorem duties when prices drop; the cross-check; and the exclusion of preferential trade from SSM coverage.

An analysis of these conditionalities is provided. Some of these clauses, if agreed upon, will severely curtail countries' ability to invoke the price-based SSM. In addition, once invoked, the remedies, as they are currently drafted, are not likely to be effective in shielding domestic producers from price volatilities.

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Analytical Note:  Comparing the Special Safeguard Provision (SSG) and the Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM): Special and Differential Treatment for Whom?

The Special Safeguard Provision (SSG) in the WTO's Agreement on Agriculture is an instrument that is regularly used by a number of developed countries to protect their agricultural sector. Most developing countries do not have access to the SSG. The Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM) has been proposed by a large number of developing countries in the Doha Round so that they too can avail of a similar and an even more effective safeguard mechanism than the SSG. Unfortunately, the conditions for the SSM have been so diluted as to make it difficult to use, and in many aspects less effective than the SSG. This paper provides a detailed comparison between the two instruments.

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