“Excessive Demands of North Would Undermine the Round’s Development Mandate”
Below is the statement of South Africa’s Ambassador Faizel Ismail at the WTO’s Trade Negotiations Committee on 29 March 2011.
We agree with your assessment that the Round is in a grave situation. Although the Round has experienced several setbacks and collapses before, we were able to pick up the pieces each time and move forward. However, this time we stand to lose everything from more than 9 years of work if we do not act wisely.
We agree the gaps between the members remain wide. Indeed we have been saying this consistently during the past two years. However, we do not agree that the main gaps or obstacles to progress lie in providing the demandeurs even more market access in NAMA through sectorals.
How we characterize the current impasse will have important implications for how we go about trying to resolve the crisis and whether we succeed in doing so.
Let us take a moment to reflect on where we have come from. The previous GATT rounds and especially the Uruguay Round tilted the playing field in agriculture and labour intensive manufactures against developing countries for more than 50 years. And the rules were biased against developing countries. The Doha Development Agenda promised to level the playing field in agriculture and tilt the balance somewhat in favour of developing countries this time.
The July 2008 package in our view was imbalanced against developing countries. The formula in NAMA provided for deep cuts in developing country tariffs whilst the package in Agriculture would retain high tariffs in developed countries and make no real cuts in the applied levels of their trade distorting subsidies. Despite this, Minister Davies agreed to work on the basis of the July and December 2008 TEXTS provided that the flexibilities sought by SACU in NAMA were made available. We agreed to this in the interests of building convergence and the multilateral trading system.
The WTO and the Multilateral Trading System served us all during one of the deepest recessions since the 1930s. It provided us with an effective antidote against protectionism in all our domestic constituencies. The recession also had some deep and profound changes in many of our economies. In South Africa we lost over a million jobs. And high levels of poverty and inequality remain our major challenges. This is not a time for deep and onerous tariff cuts that threaten jobs and create political instability.
Thus the demands by some of the major developed countries for more market access beyond what was already provided for in the July and December 2008 TEXTS must be seen in this context. These demands threatened to create more job losses and undermine our industrial development. They also threatened to tilt the balance further against developing countries and undermine the development mandate of the round. Let us remind each other that the NAMA sectorals are a voluntary modality or supplementary modality according to the Doha mandate.
However, in sharp contrast to their high demands for more market access in NAMA and Services from developing countries, developed countries were not willing to provide additional market access in Agriculture in exchange. Their current commitments allowed them sufficient space or “water” to increase their trade distorting subsidies. Agriculture tariffs in developed countries will also remain high after the proposed tariff cuts with some peaks remaining above several 100 percent! And poor Cotton producers in Africa that suffer from high subsidies in developed countries have not been able to obtain any response for these distortions to be removed. In addition, the concerns and interests of the poorest countries, such as for duty free quota free market access, remains hostage to the failure of the Doha Round to conclude.
Thus, the remaining Gap in the round cannot simply be reduced to NAMA sectorals. The main Gap in our view remains that between the promise of development in the Doha mandate and the mercantilist demands of the developed countries for more market access in NAMA and Services.
We recognize that in the current economic and political climate it may be difficult to overcome the current divide and impasse. So we encourage you Mr. Chairman to hear first hand from the main players whether the impasse can be bridged in the “window of opportunity” in 2011. The major developed countries will need to provide leadership.
How do we proceed from here?
Members may all need a period of reflection. However we caution that returning to do the same thing will not offer us a way out but only exacerbate the crisis we are in.
In the current period we should all exercise the maximum responsibility to ensure that the Multilateral System is preserved and not undermined.
We caution against any efforts to draft new texts which attempt to create convergences that have not emerged in a bottom up process. We are concerned that this may exacerbate the current differences amongst the membership and undermine the goodwill that exists between members.
Doha Talks Face “ A Very Serious Situation”: Brazil
Below is a statement by Brazil’s Ambassador Roberto Azevêdo at a meeting of the WTO’s Trade Negotiations Committee (TNC) on 29 March 2011.
In this statement, I’d like to touch on two main topics, subdivided in two issues each.
I : STATE OF PLAY
a) Recent Developments
I will start by underlining a disappointing but quite inescapable reality: we are before a very serious situation. Reports of the most recent bilaterals clearly indicate that the gaps among key negotiating partners are indeed very large, and some of the parties involved in those bilaterals believe them to be unbridgeable.
The first assessment of this situation happened recently in the G-11. We must emphasise, however, that these gaps are not a result of the G-11 process or, actually, of any process. We have to accept the fact that processes may assist but are themselves incapable of closing large substantive gaps. The G-11 was simply meant to facilitate a debate on inter-sectoral trade-offs of our give and take process.
In its sessions last week, the G-11 received reports that recent bilaterals provided more clarity to the negotiating gaps between key delegations. The G-11 was also informed that some of those engaged in the bilaterals were sceptical about the possibility of closing those gaps. After intense discussions, no concrete ideas or suggestions were offered in that group that its members felt had any chance of promoting convergence. The G-11 felt, however, that the WTO Membership as a whole had to be informed of this critical situation immediately.
b) Transparency
After the G-11 meetings of last week, I heard a number of delegations ask for more transparency regarding the gaps identified in the bilaterals. Only the delegations actually involved in those bilaterals know precisely what those gaps are. I pointed out, in this same setting two weeks ago, the nature of the demands that were put to Brazil and the reasons why we could not meet them. Let me recall them once again:
i) Although some very remarkable demands were also submitted to us in services, the more explicit and clear requests were made in NAMA sectorals. Brazil was essentially requested to bring duties down to zero for most – or all – of the NAMA lines of certain sensitive sectors such as chemicals, industrial machinery, electronics, hospital equipment, and forestry products. Such requests covered over 3,200 lines, just about a third of our NAMA universe. This contribution would result in average cuts equivalent to a coefficient 8. This represents an altogether different level of ambition for Brazil that had accepted a coefficient 20.
These sectors, together with those where Brazil will take a 33% cut on applied rates (and these include automobiles, textiles and clothing, footwear, toys, and others), account for over 3.3 million direct jobs in Brazil. These numbers clearly indicate the high degree of political sensitivity and social implications for Brazil.
Wrongly assuming that those requests would entail reciprocity, as one would expect in any reasonable negotiation, we initially explored alternatives that, inter alia, explored the scope of the requests, could achieve differentiated formula plus cuts, recognised autonomous liberalisation, etc. All were rejected outright.
ii) After the first initial interactions and later, already in the G-11 process, Brazil also realised that its efforts would not be reciprocated by any of the parties, either requesting or benefiting from such requests. Consequently, Brazil’s contribution would be essentially unilateral and non-reciprocal. In the G-11 discussions, key developed countries also unambiguously stated that they could not bring any additional contributions to the table in agricultural market access. For them, the market access negotiations in agriculture were either concluded or needed to have the level of ambition reduced to meet their particular sensitivities.
Let me be clear that I am not attempting to attribute responsibilities, divert blame, or anything of the type. If this were so, I would be offering arguments that show how reasonable – or unreasonable – certain positions are. Today, I will simply assume that the position of those delegations are responding to critical constraints, parameters of national interest, or very simply reflect what they need to get approval in their parliaments. I am merely stating facts. I am not interpreting positions. I am reciting positions as they were put to us.
This information, I believe, should give a better perspective on the demands put to us. As far as Brazil is concerned, we are ready to work with adjustments to the July 2008 package, as long as (a) the level of ambition does not change dramatically in areas that are sensitive to us, and (b) there is full and proportional reciprocity in areas of Brazil’s interest, agricultural market access in particular.
Clearly this gap is immense and we have not had any indications that the parties that urge Brazil to contribute further will recalibrate their offensive or defensive positions.
II – PROCESS FORWARD
a) Consultations of DG in early April
Brazil supports your decision to hold consultations in early April. Brazil will engage fully whenever invited to participate.
I must, nonetheless, express fundamental reservations regarding any process that tries to address roadblocks in a non-horizontal way. Some delegations before me suggested that we focus first on the NAMA impasse. It would be a grave mistake to seek flexibilities from parties in one pillar of the negotiations alone, without setting up a format of conversations that allows for the identification of potential trade-offs in the other negotiating pillars.
In this situation and under this particular juncture of negotiations, sequence matters a great deal. Let’s take NAMA for example. For Brazil (and each of us will have a different perspective depending on his particular interests) we cannot focus on the NAMA impasse without exploring whether there would be possibilities for trade-offs in agricultural market access. This would, in our view, irreversibly undermine a basic principle enshrined in every decision this TNC has taken so far: the principle that the only way forward has to based on a process of give and take.
Key developed countries already made clear that, for them, agricultural negotiations are over, certainly as far as market access is concerned. Any outstanding issues are to accommodate further sensitivities of theirs, not to increase ambition. Under these circumstances and despite any assurances to the contrary, addressing NAMA first and by itself would:
First – essentially indicate that, for some there would be giving, but no taking, and for others there would be taking, and no giving.
Second – such non-horizontal approach would discourage engagement. After all, those doing the giving would not believe in a process that requires them to show flexibility – which would be immediately pocketed – without any hope for reciprocity in other pillars.
b) Texts by Easter
It is Brazil’s view that, given all that has been said before, this is not a time to abandon the bottom-up approach. Some may be tempted to request Chairs or even you, Mr. Director-General, to use those texts to test landing zones and try to facilitate convergence. This may well be a big faux pas with irreversible consequences. At this juncture, gaps are so wide that any attempt to “split differences” will very likely be vehemently rejected by Members on both sides of the divide. This could be an additional blow to negotiations at a moment when we can still afford it.
I could not overemphasise how critical our situation is. We must all recognise that our actions and decisions may have a very direct impact on the perspectives to conclude this Round. Failure will come at a great cost for all of us, especially the smallest and the poorest among us. We all must shoulder our responsibilities and be held accountable to our actions. At this juncture, inaction or omission is not an option.
Wide Gaps in the Doha Talks — the US View
Below are extracts from a statement of Ambassador Michael Punke of the United States at the WTO’s Trade Negotiations Committee (TNC) on 29 March 2011.
Clearly the negotiations are not advancing at this point as we have all hoped -- and the gaps among Members remain wide.
First, I would acknowledge that there has been considerable interest in the bilateral discussions between the United States and China. We have important market access interests with respect to other major members as well, and those gaps must also be addressed.
I also need to note that our gap analysis is not confined to a single market access pillar, nor to a single sector, such as chemicals. Regrettably, in our view, the gaps are as significant with respect to agriculture and services as they are in NAMA.
Let me try to offer some specifics to illustrate our view of the gaps that we are confronting.
One of the most graphic examples is NAMA sectors and the product basket approach. We and other proponents of NAMA sectors have proposed an architecture with three broad elements: (1) a very substantial zero for zero basket; (2) other baskets with greater-than-formula cuts using a range of tools to address sensitivities; and (3) a basket that accommodates the use of normal NAMA flexibilities. This approach, in our view, offers the potential for balance between our need for more ambition – and the needs of others to address sensitivities.
China has taken a different approach to product baskets, and it is important to understand those differences. China also proposes a zero basket – but only developed countries would contribute to that basket. It also proposes a second basket where countries would make greater-than-formula cuts – but with developed countries contributing more than developing countries. Developing countries would self-designate the goods covered in this and other baskets. China proposes a third basket where developing countries would take formula cuts only while developed country cuts would go to zero. Finally, China proposes a fourth basket for developing country flexibilities.
We have carefully analyzed this structure. Ironically, it would significantly increase the imbalance beyond the July 08 package. This, for us, is a major gap.
In services, we discussed with key partners our priority market access interests in various areas and were told that none of these requests could be met. This too represents a major gap.
In agriculture, we give credit to key partners for being transparent with us as to how they plan to employ their flexibilities. Unfortunately, what we learned confirmed our worst fears - that we would see no new market access on our major agricultural export interests. This also represents a major gap. So while there has been much recent attention on NAMA, the gaps in services and agriculture are no less daunting.
In setting out this information today, it is not our intention to ascribe blame. But it is true that we are arriving at a clearer understanding of the gaps, as illustrated by what I’ve just outlined. And the gaps, for us, are large.
One point, however, is fundamental. We are setting the terms of global trade for decades to come, so it remains essential that this negotiation produce market access outcomes in industrial goods, services, and agriculture that are in keeping with the realities of a 21st century economy.
Texts are an important tool, but if we don’t quickly solve some of the problems we are encountering in our work, we will have to reassess whether tabling new texts in late April risks more harm than good.
This is not a time for Members to look to Chairs to solve problems that they themselves cannot solve. Such an approach, quite simply, will not work. Compromises that do not have buy-in from Members obscure gaps rather than making them clearer and can give a false sense of progress.
Brazil: Are We Facing a Doha End-Game, or the End of the Game?
The following is a statement made by Brazil’s Ambassador Roberto Carvalho de Azevedo, to the WTO’s Trade Negotiations Committee (TNC) on March 8, 2011.
I wish, at the outset, to thank the Director-General for his account on the steps taken in various negotiating fronts. It is evident from the DG’s report that much still remains to be done in the remaining weeks ahead of us.
We all clearly agree that we are not making sufficient progress despite our engagement in the various formats of the cocktail approach. We also hear comments on how the negotiating process could be improved. Some of us have misgivings about some smaller formats of the cocktail approach and the fact that they are not delivering breakthroughs. Brazil does not favour smaller formats either but without a setting for truly and meaningful horizontal discussions – something the Negotiating Groups can’t offer – we will go nowhere.
We believe most – if not all – misgivings about process stem from a deep sense of frustration with the lack of progress, which we fully share. But let’s face the facts. We do not have a problem of process. We have a problem of substance. No process, regardless of how representative, inclusive, or transparent it may be, will cure this fundamental substantive problem.
I heard all previous statements regarding the need for urgency (we all agree that there is not a moment to spare), calls for flexibility, and additional efforts. Let me be somewhat more specific than previous statements, at least for the sake of transparency with the membership. After interacting with some other delegations in the last few weeks, it seems to me that many are still not quite aware of the size of the actual existing gaps in negotiations. I’ll try to address this briefly and honestly because optimistic assessments on the state of play and words signalling commitment and determination must not hide the hard facts.
We clearly started this Round with very high expectations. High expectations are actually required at the beginning of any trade negotiation as a means to inject ambition and to drive the process forward. However, Brazil had to temper down those expectations over time and, after ten years of negotiations, we had to accept what is actually achievable.
Brazil had to agree with quite modest outcomes in agriculture – the engine of this development Round – where developed countries will enjoy all sorts of flexibilities that negate market access for products from the developing world. The Brazilian Government had to then devote more time to explain to our domestic constituencies that, although certain expectations will not be met, the overall results are worth the efforts we are undertaking. Of course many in Brazil are still unconvinced. Like constituencies in other countries, they want to see more ambition in areas of their interest.
Despite these obvious shortcomings from a developing country perspective, a few developed Members argue that what we have on the table is unbalanced and that to sell the Round at home they need further contributions. They claim that there is “unfinished business” in areas of their interest: NAMA and services. For them – even though they don’t say this clearly in meetings such as this one – agriculture is off the table. Moreover, if they have to make any further concessions in agriculture, it could only be by “cutting water” in the domestic support pillar. We could never accept such a proposition.
First, we reject the notion that the “unfinished business” exists only in some areas. All areas have important pending issues and nothing has been permanently fixed. Either we have a single undertaking or we don’t. We can’t simply raise the level of ambition in selective areas and effectively freeze others. Additional concessions from any Member have to be compensated with gains for them. Real market access can only be exchanged for equally real market access. Trade-offs have to be proportional. No serious negotiator will ever engage under the presumption that someone was tricked in 2008, that payment is owed to any particular Member. If anyone insists in obtaining unilateral concessions from others, that Member will not be helping the cause of bridging the gaps among Members.
Brazil cannot judge what others can still do at this point of negotiations. As far as Brazil is concerned, we negotiated seriously and in good faith throughout the process and we – like many others – did actually empty our pockets in the July 2008 attempt to clinch the deal. Under the negotiated NAMA formula, Brazil will cut current applied rates – not bound rates – by 33% in key strategic and vulnerable sectors such as automobiles, textiles, footwear, and toys. To be clear, these deep cuts are with the use of the flexibilities. Every study done so far – by Brazil, by the WTO secretariat, or by independent entities – show that, in this Round, Brazil will create more trade than any developed country. Some of those studies actually suggest that Brazil’s NAMA contribution is the largest among all WTO Members. We are, therefore, contributing in a very meaningful way. Any attempts to downplay this contribution are disingenuous to say the least.
Despite this disproportionate effort, Brazil is still being asked to take additional NAMA cuts that, if implemented, would average those equivalent to a formula coefficient 8, instead of the coefficient 20 of the draft modalities. These additional cuts would cover over 3,200 lines, more than a third of all our NAMA lines. To make matters even worse, these cuts would go for free, because the demandeur believes it is entitled to such unilateral contributions.
The formula cuts cannot be interpreted as a minor down payment for the actual NAMA liberalization, which would actually be delivered by the sectorals. If this view prevails – and this is a big “if” – then we have not reached the “endgame”; we have reached the “end of the game.”
Further aggravating this scenario are the existing currency asymmetries provoked by excessively flexible monetary and fiscal policies adopted by some key developed economies, not only to stimulate faster growth, but also in attempts to revert the effects of a crisis they created themselves. This is an issue that Brazil will raise in another WTO body. Therefore, I will not go into the details of this situation in this meeting. For now, let me just say that the depreciation of the major currencies essentially wiped out any impact that our tariffs had on imports.
Given this scenario, it is not surprising that Brazil’s trade balance experienced a dramatic change more recently, especially with regard to dollar denominated economies. Our trade surplus with the United States, which amounted to US$ 9.9 billion in 2006, is now a deficit of US$ 7.8 billion. This is a shift of US$ 17.6 billion against Brazilian exports. The totality of this shift occurred exclusively for NAMA products (from a US$ 6.9 billion NAMA surplus in 2006 to a US$ 10.3 billion deficit in 2010). Given this scenario, it is simply unrealistic to expect further significant and unilateral NAMA contributions by Brazil.
To conclude, let me point out that, whether we like it or not, we reached some sort of balance in 2008. We understand that for some it may not be sufficient to guarantee the selling of the DDA at home. This also applies to Brazil. Nonetheless, we must all understand that some of us – Brazil among them – are at the end of the line. These countries will not forego their development prospects, the welfare of their citizens, nor the budding social prosperity they so painstakingly achieved. We want to preserve the multilateral trading system. But it must be a system that allows for growth and social development; a system that does not give in to disproportionate demands for sacrifice in the developing world.
As we see things now, particularly in light of the need to conceive some sort of horizontal and non-selective rebalancing of ambition in a give-and-take exercise, the bottom-up process is critical if we are to enter into text-based negotiations in all areas. We can’t reach for extreme positions any longer. We all agree we don’t have time for posturing. This is the time for realism, time to find a pragmatic middle point between ambition and Members limited possibilities. Let’s identify where each of us can contribute – and some can contribute more in some areas, others in other areas – and be pragmatic. Let’s seize whatever contributions each of us can actually offer in the different negotiating areas. This is the only possible way forward.
Below is the statement of Brazil to the Trade Negotiations Committee (TNC) on 2 February 2011.
We are about to enter a most delicate stage of our process. Very soon, we will test the limits of the political engagement and ascertain whether the proclaimed commitment to an outcome will translate into negotiating flexibilities that allow us to bridge the quite significant and substantive differences that have kept us apart since early 2009.
The essence of our differences remains the same: finding a balance across the market access issues that is acceptable to all. As we all recall, the main trade-offs were defined simultaneously during the July 2008 Ministerial – agricultural tariff cuts, number and payment of sensitive products, cuts on trade-distorting domestic support, NAMA formula coefficients and flexibilities and, finally, a pledging conference on services was held.
At that time, a few issues kept us from fully agreeing on the landing zones, but the order of magnitude of what was required to close the deal was well defined in our minds. These boundaries are not simply imaginary, they were reproduced in the December 2008 draft modalities texts.
Contradicting this understanding, we now face demands that attempt to change the nature and scope of those deals. They try to selectively change the outcomes in areas where developing countries would be the only ones paying.
We do accept that ambition is an important driving force in trade negotiations. Actually, it is an indispensable one. Nonetheless, at a certain stage, particularly after long and complex negotiating efforts, ambition - particularly when coupled with selectiveness - can backfire, risking to unravel the delicate network of trade-offs we so carefully wove over the last 9 years.
The collective wisdom contained in the draft modalities texts before us constitutes an achievable balance between our collective ambitions and restraints. Those texts embody our desires framed by reality.
Our challenges concerning substance and timing do not, however, necessarily prevent us from achieving a marginally improved framework. But for this, what is required is a carefully designed and executed effort, where the fundamental premise is to keep the balance that has been achieved so far. As far as Brazil is concerned, any attempts to shift this balance away from agriculture or development are bound to fail.
The only means to accomplish this marginally improved framework is via trade-offs in which we take on board a representative cross-section of all interests - offensive and defensive – in all market access issues – NAMA, agriculture and services.
Additional concessions in one area must be matched by strictly proportional concessions in another area. More market access in NAMA or Services, means also more market access in agriculture. If some developing countries are asked to do more than the general rule applicable to all, key developed Members, especially those who have been asking for more in areas of their interests, must also do more than the general rules, not less. If we all understand and accept this, we are in good shape for this final push.
On negotiation of horizontal disciplines, they represent a major contribution to the package that has been underestimated. The outcomes there can be very significant, as is the case of trade facilitation. Negotiations of disciplines, in all areas, are also about market access and we must acknowledge this. They add significant value to the Round and they should enhance our chances of concluding negotiations successfully.
To End the Round, We Must Adhere to Fairness Principle
Below is the statement of South Africa’s Ambassador Faizel Ismail to the Informal Trade Negotiations Committee (TNC) meeting on 2 February 2011.
South Africa participated in the G20 Summit in Seoul and supports the view that 2011 presents a “window of opportunity” to conclude the Doha Round.
During the past few months South Africa participated in various initiatives that attempted to provide momentum to the Doha Round negotiations. These included the Ambassadors Small Group Process, meetings of the G11, and the recent informal Ministerial Meeting held in Davos.
The Small Group Process helped us all understand each others concerns much better but did not contribute to real movements by the major players on any of the core issues of the round. Ministers in Davos urged us to conclude the Round but did not signal any bold initiatives to break the current impasse in Geneva and give momentum to the negotiations, nor did they set any further negotiating meetings at a Ministerial level. However, they did implore us to draft new Texts by Easter and to conclude the negotiations by July.
How do we avoid the errors of 2006 when the round was suspended and again in 2008 when the round collapsed?
We propose that a successful conclusion to the round is indeed possible if we all adhere to the following principles:
First, Honour multilateral convergences and agreements reached
At the last Ministerial Conference Minister Davies clarified South Africa’s approach as follows:
“South Africa was not part of the agreements reached by some members in the July 2008 Package. As we have stated before our view is that even these texts are imbalanced and reflect too much accommodation of the sensitivities of developed countries in agriculture, while demanding too much from developing countries in terms of reducing their applied industrial tariffs and policy space for industrial development.
Despite these reservations we have been willing to work to see whether, on the basis of the existing texts, the specific problems posed for SA and SACU, arising from the historic injustice of South Africa’s classification in the Uruguay Round as a "developed country", can be resolved in a fair manner.”
However, this has not been the approach of some other members, particularly the largest developed countries that seek to re-open convergences reached in the July and December 2008 Texts.
Second, Adhere to the principle of Fairness
The current playing field in trade is uneven and biased against developing countries. It is unfair. Agricultural protection in the US, EU and other developed countries continues to undermine the agriculture development and food security concerns of a large number of developing countries, many of which are in sub-Saharan Africa, the poorest region in the world. The plight of the cotton producers from West Africa is but a reminder of a wider distortion caused by trade-distorting subsidies in the US (and in several other OECD countries). It is for this reason that the removal of these distortions in agriculture trade is the core issue in the Doha Round and is a litmus test for a development outcome.
Our assessment is that the level of ambition of the package on Agriculture reflected in the July and December 2008 Texts is extremely modest. In addition, several of the outstanding issues such as a refusal to cap extremely high tariffs, demands for more sensitive products and new TRQs and other such issues still demanded by the major developed countries will lower the ambition in Agriculture even more. Thus the current demands by the major developed countries for more market access from developing countries in NAMA and Services is unfair. It will tilt the current imbalance in the trading system and the July and December Texts even more against developing countries.
South Africa lost a million jobs during the global economic crisis that it had no part in creating. This has to be added to the 25 percent of structural unemployment that we inherited. As we begin to recover from the economic crisis and strive to create new jobs it will be unfair to expect more market access that results in more job losses from developing countries like South Africa.
Third, Respect the Doha Mandates
The Doha Round placed Agriculture at the centre of the Round. The level of ambition in NAMA and other areas of the Doha Round were to be proportionate to the level of ambition developed countries were prepared to undertake in Agriculture. The Doha mandate called for “the products of interests to developing countries to be prioritized”, in NAMA, and that required developing country contributions to be based on the concept of “Less Than Full Reciprocity” and “special and differential treatment”. Demanding more market access from so-called advanced developing countries in NAMA goes against this mandate.
The Doha Round can be concluded this year. Indeed it could have been concluded in 2006 when it was suspended, and again in 2008, when it collapsed. Trying to impose an unfair deal, that does not respect the convergences reached and the development mandate of the Doha Round will not work. The Multilateral Trading System has served us well during the economic crisis. The largest and richest economies have benefitted the most from the rules based trading system since 1947. They should be prepared to pay for this and not pass the burden of responsibility to the poorest countries. Let us all work to conclude the Doha round this year. It can be concluded successfully if we adhere to these principles. The largest developed countries should lead. The process should be inclusive and transparent. The interests and concerns of the poorest countries, especially the LDCs should be prioritized in an Early Harvest. South Africa will work with determination to conclude the round on the basis of these principles.
