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Le président du Comité du Centre Sud et ex-président de la République-Unie de Tanzanie, Benjamin W. Mkapa, s'est entretenu avec le nouveau président de la République populaire de Chine, Xi Jingping, lors de sa venue en République-Unie de Tanzanie. Le président chinois a assuré qu’il continuerait de soutenir le Centre Sud afin de promouvoir la coopération Sud-Sud. Lors d’un débat animé, dans le cadre du Forum public de l'Organisation mondiale du commerce (OMC), des ambassadeurs et d’autres experts de pays en développement ont exposé leur point de vue sur l'impasse dans laquelle se trouve le cycle de négociations de Doha organisé sous l’égide de l’OMC, sur la « nouvelle conception du commerce » lancée par les pays développés et sur la nécessité d'adopter une conception différente qui reflète la réalité, depuis le point de vue des pays en développement. Analytical Note, December 2011 This Analytical Note provides an overview of the following: issues at stake in MC8 for developing countries and key messages for Ministers; the state of play including the main events that took place in the production of the ‘Elements for Political Guidance’ text; the legal status of the Chairman’s Statement as the outcome document of the Ministerial; important process issues to be mindful of during the Ministerial; a detailed look at the issues in the ‘Elements for Political Guidance’ text; and a paragraph by paragraph analysis of the ‘Elements’ text.
Analytical Note, November 2011 This Note is an analysis of the draft waiver decision submitted by the Chairman of the CTS to Ministers for adoption at the 8th Ministerial Conference. This is essentially a waiver from the most-favoured nation treatment clause (Article II. 1) in GATS to allow Members to provide preferential and more favourable treatment to services and services suppliers of LDCs. Two main issues have arisen in the draft waiver text. Firstly the types of preferences covered by the waiver, in order to be effective, needs to go beyond market access measures. The second issue is that of rules of origin. There is need to clarify the meaning of rules of origin in the waiver. Rapport sur les politiques n°7 - Novembre 2011 La Déclaration de Doha a réaffirmé que les membres de l’OMC ont le droit de recourir aux flexibilités ménagées par l'Accord sur les ADPIC en matière de santé publique. En pratique, il est cependant très difficile pour les pays en développement et les PMA d’effectivement recourir à ces flexibilités. Le présent rapport sur les politiques tend à évaluer la mise en œuvre de la Déclaration de Doha dix ans après son adoption et à souligner les obstacles à la mise en œuvre des flexibilités ménagées par l'Accord sur les ADPIC ayant pour objectif de garantir l'accès aux médicaments à un prix abordable. Documents analytiques - avril 2011 1) État des lieux des négociations de Doha de l'OMC et remarques sur les documents du 21 avril 2011 Le 21 avril 2011, l’OMC a publié un document de 600 pages résumant les dix dernières années du Cycle de négociations de Doha. Le présent document analytique fait un examen de ce document. Bien que le Cycle de Doha ait été au départ un « programme pour le développement » qui devait donner une place centrale aux intérêts des pays en développement, l’ironie de la situation veut qu'il ne reste presqu'aucun élément de développement dans le programme. L’accord sur l’agriculture a éludé la question majeure des subventions octroyées par les pays développés. Le traitement spécial et différencié destiné aux pays en développement, tel que le mécanisme de sauvegarde spéciale (MSS), est, en pratique, inefficace. Les négociations concernant le coton n'ont pas abouti. S’agissant de l’AMNA, le document est déséquilibré et pose des problèmes, car il réduit la marge de manœuvre des pays en développement dans le choix des politiques pour mener à bien l'indispensable processus d'industrialisation. Les raisons de l’impasse des négociations de DohaLes dirigeants du Groupe des Vingt (G-20) se sont engagés à achever cette année les négociations du cycle de Doha, mais cet objectif est difficile à atteindre à cause des profondes divergences d’opinion qui existent entre les membres de l’Organisation mondiale du commerce (OMC). Les négociations de Doha ont été lancées à la fin de l’année 2001 et baptisées Programme de Doha pour le développement. La Déclaration ministérielle précisait que les intérêts des pays en développement seraient au centre des négociations. Policy Brief, November 2009 As trade ministers prepare to assemble November 30 in Geneva for further WTO talks, they are hearing another round of new and refurbished projections of how much wealthier the world might be after liberalizing trade. The upcoming ministerial is no different, and neither, fundamentally, are the projections, notwithstanding one recent claim that an ambitious Doha deal could deliver $300-$700 billion in global welfare gains, with the benefits "well-balanced" between developed and developing countries. These recent projections, from the Washington-based Peterson Institute for International Economics, contrast with the World Bank's widely publicized 2005 estimates of global gains from a "likely Doha scenario" of less than $100 billion, with just $16 billion going to developing countries. Did economists find another $150-$350 billion in benefits for developing countries that the World Bank missed in 2005? Is development back in the Doha Round. The answer, of course, is no. The purpose of this policy brief is to look behind the press releases to examine the recent economic projections, review previous estimates, and put these seemingly large numbers in their proper context. As before, the claims that developing countries will be the big winners from Doha rest on shaky assumptions, controversial economic modeling, misleading representations of the benefits, and disregard for the high costs of Doha-style liberalization for many developing countries Research Paper 30, May 2010, Updated in February 2012 This paper discusses the principles and scope of activities of the world trade organization, addresses the imbalances in the existing rules and the problems faced by developing countries. Then it elaborated on various specific issues such as, the “Singapore issues”, labour and environmental standards, the “development issues”, market access negotiations and, at last, its functioning in decision-making system. Documents analytiques - mars 2006 SYNOPSISDans cette analyse du Centre Sud de la Déclaration ministérielle de Hong Kong, nous évaluons l’évolution du Programme de travail de Doha depuis le lancement du cycle, nous examinons les répercussions de la Déclaration ministérielle de Hong Kong et nous identifions quelques questions stratégiques pour les pays en développement, qui devront être traitées dans les négociations ultérieures. L’analyse porte sur les secteurs de l’agriculture, de l’AMNA et des services. South Centre Analytical Note - September 2004 INTRODUCTIONOn 31 July 2004, the WTO General Council decided to establish a framework for continued negotiations under the Doha Work Programme set out in the Doha Ministerial Declaration (DMD, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1) of 2001. This note seeks to present a content analysis of the WTO General Council Decision of 31 July 2004 (WT/GC/W/535). The analysis of the main text of the July Decision in the first part of this Analytical Note is arranged according to the substantive issue areas identified in the DMD for either negotiations or discussions as linked to the relevant texts in the July 2004 General Council Decision. It also identifies the new negotiating timeframes established for each negotiating area and provides a brief analytical comment on the extent to which the July 2004 Decision impacts on the original Doha mandates. For ease of use, the Analytical Note has been divided into four main parts. Part I analyzes the main text of the July Decision, followed by Parts II, III, and IV, devoted to the analysis of Annex A (Agriculture), Annex B (Non-Agricultural Market Access), and Annex D (Trade Facilitation), respectively, of the July Decision. It is hoped that this note will be useful to readers as the implementation of the mandates in the July Decision proceed after the summer of 2004. Part I (Main text - A Content Analysis) Part II (Annex A, Agriculture Modalities) South Centre Analytical Note - June 2003 INTRODUCTIONParagraph 51 of the 2001 Doha Ministerial Declaration provides a unique but ambiguous mandate for the WTO’s Committees on Trade and Development (CTD) and on Trade and Environment (CTE). It requires that these two bodies “within their respective mandates, each act as a forum to identify and debate developmental and environmental aspects of the negotiations, in order to help achieve the objective of having sustainable development appropriately reflected.” This mandate attempts to implement WTO Members’ desire to ensure that the Doha Round trade negotiations promote the objective of sustainable development. This objective is deeply embedded in the WTO framework. Explicit references to it can be found in the WTO’s constitutional legal instrument – the Marrakesh Agreement to Establish the World Trade Organisation – and in subsequent WTO legal texts, such as the 1994 Ministerial Decisions on Trade and Environment and on Trade in Services and the Environment, and the 1996 and 2001 WTO Ministerial Declarations. The WTO Appellate Body in the US – Shrimps-Turtle dispute also stated that the objective of sustainable development recognised in the WTO Agreement’s preamble “informs” all of the covered agreements. The proper and effective implementation of the Paragraph 51 mandate could be the key to ensuring that the Doha trade negotiations result in a final outcome that promotes the sustainable development needs and priorities of developing countries and is consistent with the earth’s long-term ecological carrying capacity from the local to the global level. South Centre Analytical Note - May 2002 BACKGROUND (excerpt)By placing Special and Differential Treatment (hereafter referred to as ‘S&DT’) at the heart of the WTO Agreements, the Doha Ministerial Declaration explicitly acknowledged that S&DT is a fully accepted core principle in the WTO legal regime. Special and Differential Treatment should not be understood as a set of concessions made in favour of developing countries -- and the objectives recalled in the preamble of the Doha Ministerial Declaration are clear about this-- but as a right that these countries acquired in order to have a chance of participating in the multilateral trading system. |